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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2792

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR NATO MNUC NPG

SUBJ: NPG - MAY 14-15 STAFF GROUP DISCUSSION OF DRAFT NPG
PERMREPS REPORT ON FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM

REF: A. USNATO 2586; B. STATE 112991; C. USNATO 2665;
D. STATE 111700

SUMMARY. AT MAY 14-15 MEETINGS, NPG STAFF GROUP FURTHER RE-
VISED THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK
PROGRAM. US REP CONVEYED AGREEMENT OF HIS AUTHORITIES WITH
PROPOSED UNDERTAKING OF A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III (PRE-
PARATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE). STAFF GROUP REVISED THE FINAL
SECTION OF THE DRAFT REPORT TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE PRO-
POSED BROAD APPROACH. US REP TABLED SUGGESTED CHANGES TO OTHER
PARTS OF THE DRAFT REPORT WHICH THE STAFF GROUP INCORPORATED
INTOTHE REVISED TEXT PROVIDED IN PARA 7 BELOW. STAFF GROUP
IS SCHEDULED TO DISCUSS THE REVISED DRAFT ON WEDNESDAY, MAY
21 WITH A VIEW TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON A COMPLETE TEXT
FOR SYG LUNS TO ISSUE AS A FORMAL DRAFT TO PERMREPS FOR FINAL
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REVIEW AND APPROVAL IN CAPITALS. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON
COMMENTS ON THE REVISED TEXT IN PARA 7 BELOW PRIOR TO WED-
NESDAY, MAY 21. END SUMMARY.

1. AT MEETINGS ON MAY 14 AND 15, THE NPG STAFF GROUP CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON THE DRAFT NPG PERMREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM. SG REPS AGREED WITH PARAS 1-6 OF THE DRAFT TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON IN REF A, WITH NO FURTHER CHANGES. AS A RESULT OF AMENDMENTS TO THE REMAINDER OF THE PAPER, THE IS HAS CIRCULATED NEW PARAGRAPHS 7-24, WHICH ARE PROVIDED IN PARA 7 BELOW. THE REVISED DRAFT WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE STAFF GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, WITH A VIEW TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT ON A COMPLETE TEXT FOR SYG LUNS TO ISSUE AS A FORMAL DRAFT TO PERMREPS FOR FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL IN CAPITALS.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF THE SECTION OF THE DRAFT ON INITIATION OF PHASE III, US REP (WOODWORTH) CONVEYED THE AGREEMENT OF HIS AUTHORITIES (REF B) WITH THE CONCEPT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAS 26-28 OF DRAFT IN REF A PROPOSING A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III. IN CONVEYING AGREEMENT, US REP EMPHASIED POINTS CONTAINED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REF B; STAFF GROUP MEMBERS PAID CLOSE ATTENTION, AND EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO THE PROPER DEFINITION OF THE PHASE III TASK FOLLOWING ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY NPG MINISTERS. MISSION COMMENT: IN LINE WITH WASHINGTON SUGGESTION IN PARA 3 OF REF B, WE WILL EMPHASIZE THESE SMAE POINTS AT THE JUNE 3 NPG PERMREPS MEETING WHEN THIS SUBJECT WILL BE DISCUSSED. END COMMENT.

3. IN LIGHT OF CONSENSUS SUPPORTING A BROAD APPROACH TO PHASE III, THE STAFF GROUP SHORTENED SECTION IV OF THE DRAFT REPORT BY DELETING DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS DRAFT. THE REVISED TEXT IN PARA 7 BELOW COMES RIGHT TO THE POINT, AND CONTAINS SOME EDITORIAL MODIFICATIONS AS WELL.

4. THE OTHER PARAGRAPHS IN THE REVISED TEXT BELOW (7-19) CONTAIN SOME CHANGES FROM THE PREVIOUS DRAFT, LARGELY STEMMING FROM SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TABLED BY US REP REFLECTING MISSION COMMENTS PROVIDED TO WASHINGTON IN REF C, PARA 6. BECAUSE SOME OF THIS MATERIAL IS NEW, STAFF GROUP REPS AGREED ON THE REVISED TEXT ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS. MISSION BELIEVES RE-SECRET

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VED TEXT CONSTITUTES SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT, SUBSTANTIVELY AND EDITORIALY.

5. PRINCIPAL AREAS OF DISCUSSION IN THE STAFF GROUP CONCERNED NEW PARA 7 ON LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES, AND PARAS 10-12 RELATING TO MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. ON THE FORMER, UK REP (BEAUMONT) AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, FRG REP (HUBER) STRUGGLED TO WATER DOWN DISCUSSION OF THE LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES, BUT RELENTED AFTER THE NEW LANGUAGE RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE STAFF GROUP. COMMENT. MISSION BELIEVES NEW LANGUAGE IN PARA 7 PROVIDES BALANCED AND VALID COMMENT ON LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES, AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. WE NOTE THAT COMMENT IN REF D, PARA 1(C), INDICATES THAT WASH-

INGTON SHARES THIS VIEW. END COMMENT.

6. CONCERNING PARAS 10-12, UK AND FRG REPS, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CANADIAN REP (BECKETT), DISPLAYED INITIAL INCLINATIONS TO MINIMIZE DISCUSSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, POINT UP ANY CONVINCING SUBSTANTIVE FAULTS WITH THESE PARAGRAPHS, AND OTHER REPS POSED NO OBJECTIONS TO THEM. COMMENT: MISSION BELIEVES THESE PARAGRAPHS PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF DISCUSSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. WE BELIEVE THRUST OF THESE PARAGRAPHS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BECAUSE OF OBVIOUS RELEVANCE OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS TO GENERAL SUBJECT OF FOLLOW-ON USE, AS WELL AS INITIAL USE. END COMMENT.

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7. BEGIN REVISED TEXT OF PARAS 7 - 24:

7. WE AGREE WITH THESE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGEST THEY BE AFFORDED CLOSE CONSIDERATION BY POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THIS REPORT SEEKS TO HIGHLIGHT CERTAIN KEY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE HAVE SPECIAL RELEVANCE FOR NATO POLICY AND WILL BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO MINISTERS. IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT, MINISTERS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND LIMITATIONS IN THE SCOPE OF THE PHASE I STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THEIR ANALYSES. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE STUDIES, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR TERMS OF REFERENCE, FOCUSED ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON USE, RESULTING IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS(1). FURTHER, SINCE THE PHASE I STUDIES WERE DESIGNED TO EXAMINE THE FOLLOW-ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO, THEY HAD TO ASSUME AN OPENING SITUATION IN WHICH NATO NECESSARILY HAD TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHERE DETERRENCE FAILED, CON-

VENTIONAL DEFENSE PROVED TO BE INADEQUATE, AND INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DID NOT CONVINCE THE AGGRESSOR TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW(2). THESE SCENARIOS, WHICH ARE IN NO WAY UNREALISTIC, PLACED NATO IN UNFAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES FROM THE OUTSET. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO THE PHASE II SECRET

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STUDY TEAM'S COMMENT THAT THE OUTCOME IN MILITARY TERMS OF THE PHASE I STUDIES IS CRITICALLY DEPENDENT, INTER ALIA, UPON THE ASSUMPTIONS; I.E., WARSAW PACT HAD CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, WAS ABLE TO RETURN TO THE ENGAGEMENT,

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 16
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19.

AND WAS PREPARED TO RESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF HIS OWN. WHILE IN NO WAY LESSENING THE VALUE OF THE PHASE I STUDIES AND THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THE WIDE RANGE OF VARIABLES WHICH COULD AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENTS. WE WOULD OBSERVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT MAY NOT BE EXHAUSTIVE IN THAT OTHER ASSUMPTIONS MAY HAVE LED TO ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE YIELDED FURTHER INSIGHT.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

8. A PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT IS(1) THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CANNOT REPLACE THEM. THIS CONCLUSION, WHICH WE ENDORSE, SUPPORTS CURRENT NATO DEFENCE CONCEPTS(2), AND EMPHASISES THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING AND EXPLOITING NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(3). WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT THE GREATER THE CAPABILITY OF NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK, THE HIGHER THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO. SIMILARLY, WE AGREE WITH THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO PLAY AT EVERY STAGE OF A CONFLICT, NOTABLY CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE, AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS; THEY ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CANNOT BE REPLACED BY THEM. FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE THREAT POSED BY THEATRE

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75
 - (2) NPG/D(73)16, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1973, PARAGRAPH 20
 - (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75(C)

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NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD AFFECT ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE THEATRE, INCLUDING STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, AND THE SIZE AND DISPOSITION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD INFLUENCE TIMING, SCALE OF USE AND LOCATION AND NATURE OF TARGETS IN NUCLEAR OPERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE WARSAW PACT'S CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY ASSUMED IN THE PHASE I STUDIES, CONTROLLED AND LIMITED NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION IN WHICH AVAILABLE REINFORCEMENTS MIGHT BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR(1), SUGGESTING THAT THE CHOICE OF THE TYPE OF TARGETS TO STRIKE, E.G., THE RESERVES, MIGHT BE VERY IMPORTANT.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF FOLLOW-ON USE.

9. POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT RECOGNISES THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN RELATION TO MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS WHEN IT STATES THAT(2) "THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION NOT JUST TO SPECIFIC MILITARY GOALS BUT ABOVE ALL TO THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW." ANY NEED FOR NATO TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD STEM FROM INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS DEFENSIVE OBJECTIVES WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES ALONE. SINCE IT CANNOT BE FORESEEN WHEN OR WHERE THIS SITUATION MIGHT OCCUR, THE NATURE AND TIME FRAME OF, AND INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN,NATO'S INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE DETERMINED IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, IF NATO'S

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 39

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 29 AND 74

INITIAL USE, WHATEVER ITS MAGNITUDE AND DURATION, AND NATO'S PARALLEL POLITICAL EFFORTS FAILED TO INDUCE AN AGGRESSOR TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW, NATO WILL INEVITABLY HAVE TO TAKE NUCLEAR FOLLOW-ON MEASURES(1). THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT CONCLUDES(2) THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR FOLLOW-ON USE TO CONVEY TO THE ADVERSARY AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVINCING SIGNAL OF THE RISK HE WILL FACE IF HE DOES NOT CEASE HIS AGGRESSION MIGHT REQUIRE THAT THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLUTION.

10. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.

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MINISTERS WILL RECALL THAT IN THE PHASE I STUDIES, NATO'S INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GENERALLY TOOK PLACE ON A SCALE SUCH THAT THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED, THUS PERMITTING HIM THE OPTION OF CONTINUING HIS ADVANCE CONVENTIONALLY. INITIAL USE, AT SUCH A SCALE, MIGHT CONVEY TO THE ENEMY LACK OF RESOLVE BY NATO TO DEFEND ITS TERRITORY,THUS ENTAILING LARGER SCALE FOLLOW-ON USE IN LATER STAGES OF A CONFLICT WHEN WARSAW PACT RESPONSE "IN KIND" WOULD BE EVEN MORE DEVASTATING TO NATO. GIVEN THE FAILURE OF

ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES THROUGH INITIAL USE, FOLLOW-ON USE
BY NATO ON A SMALLER SCALE THAN INITIAL USE(3) MAY BE EVEN LESS
CREDIBLE, AND, THEREFORE, ALSO UNSUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING AN
ENEMY TO TERMINATE HIS ATTACK. ON THE OTHER HAND, EITHER
INITIAL OR FOLLOW-ON USE ON A SCALE WITH SUFFICIENT MILITARY
EFFECT TO DISRUPT THE ENEMY'S

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- (1) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970, PARAGRAPH 89
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 66, 79(B), 81(B).
 - (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 67

ADVANCE, COULD CAUSE HIM TO REASSESS HIS OBJECTIVES AND PRO-
BABLE COSTS, FORCING HIM TO TAKE A DELIBERATE DECISION TO EITHER
CEASE HIS ATTACK OR TO RETALIATE "IN KIND" OR ESCALATE. THERE-
FORE, THE SCALE OF USE WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BOTH IN
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND IN ENSURING THAT THE POLITICAL
OBJECTIVE IS ACHIEVED. NATO WOULD NEED TO WEIGHT CAREFULLY
SUCH CONSIDERATIONS IN ANY DECISION ON EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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11. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT CALLS ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS OF CAPABILITIES OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCES FOR ACHIEVING
NATO'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES(1). RELATIVE CAP-
ABILITIES IN WEAPONRY, TARGET ACQUISITION, COMMAND AND CONTROL,
AND SURVIVABILITY OF FORCES ARE IMPORTANT VARIABLES WHICH COULD
SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME OF THESE FACTORS ARE BEING EX-
AMINED IN THE NPG STUDY ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLI-
CATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS(2), WHICH COULD PROVIDE IMPORTANT INSIGHTS FOR NATO'S FORCE PLANNING AND POLICY FOR THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENEMY'S RESPONSE IN AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENTS IS RECOGNISED BY THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT WHICH CONCLUDES(3) THAT THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON ENEMY PERCEPTION OF NATO'S DEFENSIVE EFFORT

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 30-33

(2) NPG/D(74)3

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(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81(A)

AS WELL AS HIS CONSEQUENT REACTION. THUS, NATO STRATEGY AND POLICY FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR NATO TO ESCALATE AS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES(1).

12. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM DID NOT DEFINE THE UPPER LIMITS OF FOLLOW-ON USE(2), NOR DID IT EXAMINE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVAILABLE THEATRE OPTIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRIKES. IN THIS REGARD, THE PLANNING BASE FOR EXECUTING SELECTIVE USE CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE AS SACEUR'S SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING PROGRESSES. SELECTIVE USE UP TO A LIMIT WHERE DISTINCTION IS STILL POSSIBLE FROM GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE(3), AND INCLUDING LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS FROM THE STRATEGIC ARSENAL (AS DISCUSSED IN RECENT NPG MEETINGS) ARE ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES IN NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE.

13. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND USE IN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS. ESCALATION IN FOLLOW-ON USE COULD BE DEMONSTRATED ALSO THROUGH SELECTION OF TARGETS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE ENEMY AND THROUGH THE OPTION TO STRIKE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA(4). WE FURTHER NOTE THAT THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATED IN THE SUMMARY(5) THAT PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IS ONE OF THE BASES ON WHICH THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY RESTS. THE LATTER OPTION, IN PARTICULAR, COULD INTRODUCE AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT OF ESCALATION.

(1) MC 14/3 (FINAL, 16TH JANUARY, 1968, PARAGRAPHS 17 AND 22

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75

(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 74

(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 45,47,48,49,70,75(E),79

(5) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 79

14. TIMING IN FOLLOW-ON USE. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATES THAT THE TIMING FOR FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD DEPEND UPON A COMBINATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE ULTIMATELY INSEPARABLE(1). HOWEVER, IT RECOGNISES THAT,

IN NARROW TERMS, POLITICAL OBJECTIVES MIGHT, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE IN CONFLICT WITH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EARLY FOLLOW-ON USE, AND THAT SINCE ACTUAL SITUATIONS CANNOT
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BE PRE-DETERMINED(2), ONLY VERY GENERAL GUIDANCE COULD BE GIVEN. SUCH GUIDANCE COULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS SUCH AS:

- (A) THE NEED TO GIVE THE ENEMY TIME TO PERCEIVE NATO POLITICAL AIMS BALANCED AGAINST POSSIBLE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES OF DELIBERATELY INTRODUCING DELAYS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(3);
- (B) THE AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A LAST RESORT AFTER OR SHORTLY BEFORE THE EXHAUSTION OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES;
- (C) THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS BY TIMELY USE WHERE FLEETING TARGETS MUST BE ATTACKED.

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 42
 - (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44

15. COLLATERAL DAMAGE. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(1) CAUTIONS(1) THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE DATA, INCLUDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN THE PHASE I STUDIES, MUST BE TREATED AS PROVIDING ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE RATHER THAN PRECISE FIGURES IN VIEW OF THE HYPOTHETICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE NATURE OF THE STUDIES AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS. THE REPORT ALSO MENTIONS VARIOUS TECHNIQUES USED IN SOME PHASE I STUDIES AND ALREADY AVAILABLE TO NATO COMMANDERS TO MINIMISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE(2). WE WELCOME THE ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THIS SUBJECT IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AND BELIEVE THAT NATO'S PLANNING OF FORCES SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASISE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NOTE THAT THE NPG STUDY NOW UNDERWAY(3) ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY POINT TO IMPROVED POSSIBILITIES TO REDUCE AND CONTROL COLLATERAL DAMAGE, WHILE MAINTAINING OR ENHANCING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.

SELECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO STRATEGY.

16. DURING FORMER NPG MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLICATIONS OF NATO STRATEGY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE, HAS BEEN RECOGNISED. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT HAS LIKEWISE CONCLUDED(4) THAT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE OPTION IS A CARDINAL COMPONENT IN NATO'S WHOLE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. FURTHERMORE, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE BASIC
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NATO MILITARY STRATEGY, MC 14/3, PROVIDES THE ALLIANCE WITH SUFFICIENT CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY FOR A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS

FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 34 THROUGH 37,
AND 75(B)
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75(B)
 - (3) NPG/D(74)3
 - (4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 80

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17. WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING IN THE TIME OF CRISIS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT MUST SERVE TO ACHIEVE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO AREA. FLEXIBILITY REFERS TO THE RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO, AS WELL AS TO THE RELATED PROCESS THROUGH WHICH SUCH OPTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED. IT NOT ONLY REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO COPE WITH VARIOUS TYPES OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, BUT ALSO REQUIRES NOT TO HAVE THE RESOLVE TO APPLY THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF MILITARY POWER. SUCH A STRATEGY EMPHASISES FORWARD DEFENCE COUPLED WITH THE AIM OF TERMINATING HOSTILITIES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVING NATO'S OBJECTIVES.

18. WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY IN A GIVEN SITUATION, ACCORDING TO THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, WOULD MOST LIKELY START FROM THE EXPECTATION(1) THAT WARSAW PACT INITIAL ATTACKS WOULD LIKELY BE NON-NUCLEAR AND THAT SOVIET LEADERS, RECOGNISING THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL WAR, MAY BE RELUCTANT TO DELIBERATELY ESCALATE LIMITED CONFLICTS(2). THIS JUSTIFIES AN EMPLOYMENT POLICY PROVIDING FOR CONTROLLED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGNED

TO LESSEN THE RISKS OF ESCALATION. SUCH USE MAY INVOLVE PHASING
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BETWEEN INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE, AND IN SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF
FOLLOW-ON USE, WHICH MAY HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING TIME TO
ASSESS ENEMY REACTION. AS FOR MAGNITUDE OF USE, LOW-SCALE
OPTIONS MAY CARRY LESS RISK OF

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 19
(2) REFER TO MC 161/74 FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT.

RETALIATION, BUT MILITARILY MAY ACHIEVE LIMITED RESULTS, AND
POLITICALLY MAY BE INTERPRETED BY THE ADVERSARY AS DEMON-
STRATING LACK OF RESOLVE. ALTERNATIVELY, NATO MIGHT CHOOSE TO
ESCALATE MORE SHARPLY WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY RESULTS SO AS TO GIVE STRONGER EVIDENCE OF THE
ALLIANCE'S RESOLVE, ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION MIGHT CARRY A GREATER
RISK OF ESCALATION. BOTH ALTERNATIVES ARE, OF COURSE, COMPATIBLE
WITH NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE CONCEPT OF
POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT(1).

SUMMARY

19. WE AGREE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE
II STUDY TEAM REPORT(2). WHILE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES
NOT PROVIDE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN ADEQUATE ALLIANCE CON-
VENTIONAL DEFENCE POSTURE, THE TACTICAL USE OPTION IS AN
ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES
AND ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND MIGHT PROVIDE THE MEANS OF
INDUCING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. IN
POSSESSING THIS OPTION, NATO COULD NOT BE THREATENED WITH A
FORM OF ATTACK TO WHICH IT COULD NOT REPLY. IT COULD RESORT
TO THE TACTICAL USE OPTION FOR DIRECT DEFENCE OR FOR DELIBERATE
ESCALATION(3). THEREFORE, THE OPTION FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS ONE LEG OF THE TRIAD, IS A CARDINAL COM-
PONENT IN NATO'S WHOLE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBILITY
OF RESPONSE. IN THIS REGARD, THE GREATER THE

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 77, 78 MC 14/3
(FINAL, 16TH JANUARY, 1968, PARAGRAPH 17 AND 22
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81, QUOTED IN
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS REPORT
(3) MC 14/3, PARAGRAPH 17(B).
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CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK,
THE HIGHER THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BY NATO. HOWEVER, IF NATO MUST ESCALATE TO ACHIEVE ITS OB-
JECTIVES, WE CONCLUDE THAT NATO CAN DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE TO

CONTINUE WITH NUCLEAR DEFENCE MEASURES THROUGH COMBINATIONS OF VARIOUS FACTORS SUCH AS DIFFERENT TARGETS, MAGNITUDE OF USE, LOCATION OF TARGETS INCLUDING USE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, AND TIME OR DURATION OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE. SINCE POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR FOLLOW-ON USE (PHASE III) WOULD, AMONG OTHER ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATING AGREED NATO STRATEGY, NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON WAYS TO PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY EVIDENCE, WE CONSIDER THE DETAILED TREATMENT OF THIS CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AS MOST USEFUL.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07

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IV. FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME - INITIATION OF PHASE III

20. IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AND THIS RELATED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT NPG MINISTERS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE, PURPOSE AND TIMING OF PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME. THE PHASE III TASK AS ENVISAGED BY THE NPG MINISTERS IN 1971(1) WAS THE "FORMULATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE". THE MINISTERS DID NOT SEE FIT AT THAT TIME TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE TO GUIDE THE PHASE III EFFORT.

21. FROM ITS INCEPTION THE NPG HAS DEVOTED MUCH ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF THIS EFFORT ARE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO(2), GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(3), SPECIAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS (ADM)(4), CONCEPT FOR THE ROLE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES IN ACE(5). IT WAS WITH THE SAME CONVICTION THAT A DEEPER AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE USE OF

THEATRE NUCLEAR

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- (1) NPG/D(71)7, 27TH JULY, 1971, PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 21
 - (2) DPD/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970
 - (3) DPC/D(69)59, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1969
 - (4) DPC/D(70)60, 10TH DECEMBER, 1970
 - (5) DPC/D(70)59(REVISED), 21ST DECEMBER, 1972

WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE WOULD BE DESIRABLE, THAT THE NPG INITIATED THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF OTHER STUDIES, SOME COMPLETED AND OTHERS ON-GOING, WHICH BEAR ON THE COMPLEX OF ISSUES SURROUNDING THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MORE RECENTLY, FURTHER EVALUATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS REQUIRED BY THE NUNN AMENDMENT, AS A RESULT OF WHICH WE EXPECT OTHER WORK TO BE CARRIED OUT BY NATO. WE BELIEVE THESE EFFORTS TAKEN TOGETHER POINT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OVERALL POLICY FOR THE DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO.

22. IN DRAWING TOGETHER IN ONE PAPER THE CONCLUSIONS AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS THE AIM WOULD BE TO PRODUCE A CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF NATO'S CONCEPT FOR THE USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD NOT SUPERSEDE THE PRESENT GUIDANCE, ALTHOUGH, WHEN COMPLETED, IT MIGHT SHOW WHERE THOSE GUIDELINES SHOULD BE REFINED. WE SUGGEST A PHASE III APPROACH WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A PROGRAMME CAREFULLY LAID DOWN TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NOT ONLY THE PHASE II REPORT BUT ALSO OF ON-GOING NPG WORK IN RELATED AREAS.

23. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE WORK TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN FULFILMENT OF PHASE III, WE SUGGEST THAT MINISTERS APPROVE, IN PRINCIPLE, THE PROPOSAL SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 22 ABOVE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, REQUEST PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR ITS INITIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE AUTUMN 1975 NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

24. THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO:

- (A) TAKE NOTE OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(1);
- (A) DRAW ON THIS REPORT FOR THEIR DISCUSSION;
- (C) APPROVE, IN PRINCIPLE, THE PROPOSED APPROACH FOR PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 22

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ABOVE;

- (D) INVITE THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR ITS INITIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION TO BE CON-

SIDERED BY MINISTERS AT THEIR AUTUMN 1975 MEETING.

(1) NPG/D(75)1, 27TH MARCH, 1975

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